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THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF 
QUANTIFICATION TO A DISCUSSION OF OBJECTIVITY IN 
ECONOMICSi  
 
Laura Centemeri (CES-University of Coimbra): centemeri@ces.uc.pt 
 
Abstract (100 words) 
In this chapter I analyse objectivity in economics from the perspective of the sociology 
of quantification as the result of ‘investments in forms’ supporting public action and the 
public discussion concerning collective ends and means to be pursued. Quantification is 
guaranteed by ‘conventions of quantification’ that are the outcome of controversies 
about the good, or convenient, way to evaluate persons and things, according to 
desirable social goals aimed at. The current emphasis on quantified objectives to 
evaluate public action urges social scientists openly to discuss, instead of concealing or 
denouncing, the agreed upon realism of quantified objects.  
 
The aim of this contribution is to discuss the issue of economic knowledge objectivity 
from the perspective of the sociology of quantification (Desrosières 1992; 1993; 2008). 
According to this approach, quantification, that is, the expression through numbers of 
relevant information formerly expressed with words, is a specific “format of 
knowledge’ (Thévenot 1997; Eymard-Duvernay et al. 2005) which, by virtue of its high 
degree of universalism, can support the coordination among anonymous and distant 
actors. Quantification and objectivity are consequently strictly associated, since 
historically objectivity emerged in our societies as a fundamental category in the 
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construction and organisation of modern politics, to qualify a knowledge produced 
according to conventions (rules and procedures) supposed to guarantee impersonality, 
impartiality and fairness. Among them, conventions of quantification have 
progressively become highly valued. In fact, quantification permits us not only radically 
to limit the distortions produced when knowledge is transferred across time and space 
but it also makes reasoning ‘more uniform’ (Porter 1995: 5) through the recourse to 
formalisation (especially mathematical formalisation). This aspect shows a link existing 
between the quest for objectivity and the quest for transparency in public decision-
making procedures.  
Following this line of reasoning, in order to understand the increasing centrality in our 
societies of quantified knowledge, it is necessary, first of all, to clarify the link existing 
between objectivity and public action in the public space. A consequence that follows, 
once objectivity is analysed as the result of a process of ‘investment in forms’ 
(Thévenot 1984, 1986) supporting public action, is that quantified knowledge cannot be 
considered as normative neutral. In order to have objects univocally measurable, agreed 
upon conventions of quantification are needed (Desrosières 2008: 10-11). These 
conventions of quantification are the result of controversies and negotiation concerning 
the good way to quantify. This latter is defined according to the desirable collective 
goals that quantification is supposed to help to achieve through the public action it 
supports.  
The public demand for quantified knowledge has influenced the evolution of social 
sciences, especially economics. This evolution has been characterised by a tendency 
towards the proliferation of quantified economic objects and the increasing use of 
mathematical formalism. This emphasis on mathematical formalism has progressively 
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concealed the fundamental role played by conventions of quantification, stressing 
instead the role of measures. In fact, once procedures for quantification are settled, an 
effect of reification takes place, turning quantified economic objects into entities that 
are assumed as naturally measurable. At the same time, these objects can become 
dysfunctional in guiding decision-making during periods of social and economic 
transformations that radically challenge existing forms of regulation. It is during times 
of crisis that conventions of quantification usually return to the spotlight, revealing the 
artificial nature of quantified economic objects.  
In this chapter, I discuss the growing emphasis on social and economic quantified 
knowledge as related to the recent evolution towards an increasing legitimacy of forms 
of “governing by objectives” (Thévenot 2010). The growing emphasis on quantified 
objectives as a guide for public action brings to the fore a specific form of public 
responsibility on the part of social scientists in openly discussing, instead of concealing 
or denouncing, what we can call the agreed upon realism of quantified objects. 
Quantified social and economic objects are by definition artificial, but at the same time 
they have to be considered as real in order to support and stabilise forms of coordination 
that guarantee the achievement of socially desirable goals. As I will argue throughout 
this chapter, this apparent paradox is a constitutive tension pervading the public 
dimension of social life. To keep this paradox open is what makes possible the very 
same existence of a public space.  
OBJECTIVITY AND PUBLIC ACTION IN MODERN COMPLEX SOCIETIES  
The existence of a link between the emergence of the category of objectivity and the 
modern construction of a public dimension in collective life is central to the historical 
analysis developed by Theodor Porter, who defines objectivity as a ‘public form of 
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knowing and communicating’ (Porter 1995: IX). The adjective ‘public’ implies that 
what is the object of knowing and communicating should be recognised as the very 
same object by distant persons, not sharing any familiar or tacit knowledge.  
If we understand objectivity as the expression of knowledge in stable and highly 
conventionalised forms, it is easier to understand the connection often established 
between objectivity and numbers. Numbers are considered as a way to express things in 
objective terms. In fact, quantification is a specific language which is endowed with 
remarkable properties of transferability and stability. Still, numbers alone are not a 
guarantee of objectivity: ‘a land surface can be described quantitatively in an infinite 
variety of ways. But a square grid has usually been preferred by central governments on 
account of its greater simplicity. A highly organised labor force was required to produce 
one, but once in place it permitted land claims to be registered and enforced from 
hundreds of miles away, with a bare minimum of judgment or local knowledge’ (Porter 
1995: 22).  
In this passage, the objectivity of a measure is associated with its standardisation, that is 
to the existence of shared conventions regulating the way measure has to be actually 
performed (the square grid). The general validity of these conventions and their 
enforcement across time and space as the proper way to express things quantitatively, as 
well as their incorporation into instruments and rules, are what allows us to abstract 
from personal and local ways to know and to define a form of knowledge that can be 
widely scrutinised and judged. In this sense, objective knowledge is first of all 
impersonal and detached knowledge: objectivity implies subordination to publicly 
shared standards of personal and local ways to relate to and to judge others and the 
material environment.  
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In his historical reconstruction, Porter highlights how impersonality and detachment 
began to acquire a central place in political life once universalism starts to consolidate 
as a new source of the legitimacy of the rising nation state authority. The validity of law 
was no longer supposed to depend on intimate knowledge or personal contacts but 
should be effective over great distances and enforceable by actors detached from local 
contexts. The development of modern science, that also aims at defining universal laws, 
has been fundamental in providing standardised, stable and transferrable knowledge for 
settling conflicts that could no longer be dealt with by resorting to previous forms of 
local authority and knowledge. The drive for objectivity thus arose in response to a 
world in which discretion had become suspect and local knowledge had become 
inadequate in supporting forms of coordination increasingly based on anonymity and 
distance. This is the modern world of democratic politics,  the market economy and 
industrialisation in which a costly work of objectification of the natural and the social 
world is pursued in order to make transparent to public scrutiny decisions that are made 
and that affect the political community (Porter 1995: 32). It is in these circumstances 
that a specific form of action, that is, public action, has historically emerged.  
In our societies, what accounts for the public nature of an action is not the public status 
of the subject who acts. Consequently, public action cannot be confined to the action 
undertaken by the state. Action is public because it has specific traits of publicness 
(Hirschman 1982). Following Boltanski and Thévenot (1991), the main trait accounting 
for publicness is justification. In our societies, public action is constrained in its 
unfolding by an imperative of justification. This imperative involves two requirements: 
a qualification according to general categories (as opposed to personal or singular 
criteria) of persons, objects and events in the situation; the necessity to establish a 
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connection between the course of action undertaken in the given situation and a 
legitimate common good aimed at through acting, benefiting the whole political 
community.  
According to Boltanski and Thévenot (1991), our societies can be considered complex, 
or plural, since different specifications of the common good have historically emerged. 
The authors identify, through the study of situations of actual disputes and with 
reference to major works of philosophical thought, six definitions of the common good 
that in our societies inform six corresponding ‘orders of worth’,ii or coherent principles 
of evaluation and judgment that can organise the political community. These principles 
are: market competition, industrial efficiency, public renown, civic solidarity, domestic 
trust, inspiration.  
A consequence of this pluralism is a condition of normative uncertainty that pervades 
our collective life, accounting for the existence of criticism and disputes. We strive to 
reduce this uncertainty by stabilising common objects of reference for action: ‘persons, 
in order to cope with uncertainty, rely on things, objects, devices which are used as 
stable referents, on which reality tests or trials can be based. These reality tests enable 
judgments to reach a grounded and legitimate agreement and, hence, provide the 
possibility of ending the disputes’ (Boltanski and Thévenot 1999: 367).  
The concept of reality test is what in Boltanski and Thévenot’s approach clarifies the 
connection existing between objectivity and justification. The authors argue that the 
relation established by justification between public action and a common good is not 
merely discursive. Discursive justifications are submitted to reality tests which are 
performed through objectified knowledge or conventional entities (Desrosières 1993: 
19; Thévenot 2007). The key role played by reality tests in justification accounts for 
 7 
objectivity being a fundamental requirement for the existence of a legitimate public 
action since the process of objectifying provides clear footholds to describe economic 
situations, to denounce injustice, to define and act upon public problems. In other terms: 
‘The formation of a public space in which it is possible to debate contradictory options 
concerning the political community presupposes the existence of a minimum of 
elements that can play as common objects of reference to the different actors involved’ 
(Desrosières 1992: 142).  
Objectivity is, then, considered in this approach as the result of a social process of 
objectifying, that is, of identifying entities (to inform the reality) and of defining 
conventions guiding the production of knowledge about them (to conform the reality) so 
as to manufacture solid objects of knowledge that are able to support the organisation of 
the political community (Thévenot 2009). 
According to the reality test hypothesis, the process of objectifying knowledge is 
functional to the stabilization of a specific form of coordination among actors, which is 
expected to guarantee the achievement of a common good. This implies that an 
evaluative dimension is inherent to the process of objectification. Let us take the 
example of market coordination, which aims at achieving the common good of market 
competition, according to Walras’s model of general economic equilibrium. The 
process of objectifying, in this case, involves the transformation of what are initially 
‘mere things’ into ‘market goods’, that is, objects whose relevant qualities for exchange 
have to be unambiguously known to all the participants in the market. If all the 
participants share the knowledge about the relevant qualities of the goods exchanged, 
then prices convey all the information needed, and action can be guided by parametric 
rationality so as to achieve efficient market competition. As pointed out by Orléan 
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(2003) we should not consider as anodyne the distinction between ‘mere things’ and 
‘market goods’. iii  In both cases we are confronted with objects, but their specific 
objectivity is distinct. This distinction exists because the objectivity of market goods is 
defined with reference to the goal of assuring market competition. This goal implies that 
specific traits of ‘mere things’ are isolated as relevant for their being exchangeable and 
have to be categorised in a unanimous way, according to a typology known by 
everybody. As the case of markets with asymmetric information shows (Akerlof 1970), 
if we lack a common knowledge of the relevant qualities of the object exchanged, then 
all the participants in the market have first of all to try to work out the way in which the 
object is envisioned by others. Consequently, their action is guided by strategic 
rationality which does not assure that the goal of market competition will be reached. 
The problem with markets with asymmetric information is exactly that they lack the 
objectivity of the goods exchanged. By contrast, if actors categorise in a unanimous 
way, the resulting objectivity of market goods allows for parametric rationality to guide 
action so as to achieve market competition. 
 This example helps to clarify that to objectify is to isolate relevant features of reality 
and to stabilise the forms of producing knowledge and sharing information. We can say 
that the objectification process is supported by the production of ‘investments in forms’ 
(Thévenot 1984, 1986) that bring into existence solid objects of knowledge that set the 
frame for the kind of coordination needed in order to achieve a specific common good.  
The use of the concept of ‘investment’ is pertinent here, since the construction of a 
complex socio-technical infrastructure is needed in order to inform and conform reality 
(the costly part of the investment), but once the form is fixed, uncertainty is radically 
 9 
reduced, and coordination can be guaranteed a high degree of stability and consensus 
(the gain of the investment). 
Following Thévenot (1986, 2009), an investment in forms can have different degrees of 
temporal and spatial validity as well as of the solidity of the socio-technical network 
involved. Temporal validity is the period of time in which the investment is operative in 
a community of users. Spatial validity refers to the boundaries demarcating the 
community within which the form is valid. Finally, the solidity of an invested form 
varies with the weight of its material equipment.    
It is, then, possible to distinguish degrees of objectivity, specified in terms of different 
degrees of temporal and spatial validity and solidity of the investments in form that 
assure the production of a solid object of knowledge. A high degree of objectivity is 
consequently related to a high degree of temporal and spatial validity of the investment. 
But objectivity is also related to the material equipments needed in order to assure the 
production of knowledge in the due form. In various fields of policies, for example in 
health policies, what is called ‘evidence’ is ranked in terms of ‘degree of evidence’, that 
is, in terms of stronger or weaker objectivity. Evidence based on statistical equipments 
is the one considered as having the highest degree of objectivity, while evidence based 
on ‘expert consensus’, for example, does not involve the same solidity, in objective 
terms. This is because the objectivity based on expert consensus relies on the judgment 
of experts and not on stable equipments assuring a truly impersonal and detached 
processing of information. In this example, both forms of knowledge can be considered 
as objective, since they are both standardised and submitted to shared conventions of 
general validity. The different weight of the material equipment involved in their 
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production accounts for the different degree of solidity of these two forms of objectified 
knowledge.   
To summarise, objectified knowledge can have different degrees of objectivity that are 
related to the higher or lower degree of time and space validity of the form in which 
knowledge is formatted and to the weight of the material equipment involved in its 
production. Investments in forms which support the objectification process are meant to 
stabilise a specific form of public action, that is, an action submitted to an imperative of 
justification. The gain the investment guarantees is in terms of reducing the uncertainty, 
that is, of stabilising reciprocal expectations on how people and things are going to act, 
turning coordination effortless. The way these relationships are shaped and stabilised 
through informing and conforming reality is supposed to guarantee the achievement of a 
certain collective goal through the production of a common good, such as market 
competition or technical efficiency. For example, technical efficiency being what actors 
aim at in the organisation of a factory, investments in form are made so as to guarantee 
that this objective informs and conforms the reality of the situation. In this sense, as 
discussed by Thévenot (1986), the principles of scientific management detailed by 
Frederick Taylor (1911) can be analysed as an ensemble of tools and methods whose 
purpose is that of putting into the due form the worker so as to adapt the human 
resource to standardised machines, guaranteeing through their interaction the 
achievement of the goal of technical efficiency. These investments in form transform 
the ‘raw’ human being into the objectified worker. This transformation is necessary in 
order to develop a scientific management of the workforce.  
Investments in forms thus generate different ‘forms of the probable’ in terms of what 
counts as probative or provable reality in order to judge the situation as convenient or 
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not in relation to a common good that is pursued through coordination. As already 
argued, a statistically generalised statement is usually considered more objective than  
knowledge expressed in other forms, let us say through a monographic approach. It 
should be clear by now that this higher degree of objectivity is not related to statistical 
knowledge being closer to some kind of true reality of things, but to the fact that it 
conveys information in a format that has a wider spatial validity and a stronger solidity, 
in the way I have previously defined these concepts. Moreover, the statistical format of 
information can be easily included in policy instruments that embody a normative 
vision of the good organisation of a society, for example in terms of equality (civic 
worth) or efficiency (industrial worth). But other definitions of collective goals to be 
pursued in the political community (for example tradition or inspiration) call for a 
different kind of probative reality and, accordingly, privilege other forms of objectivity. 
Even if endowed with a lower degree of evidence in terms of spatial and temporal 
validity and the weight of the material equipment involved, they count as provable 
reality.  
When debating the objectivity of knowledge, it is a shortcut to assume that the issue at 
stake is the correspondence to some kind of ‘true reality’. What is at stake is, in fact, the 
politics subsumed into the elaboration of objective knowledge, i.e., the wider 
characterisation of the common good implicit in the criteria used to define the 
information that has to be considered as probative. The connection existing between 
different forms and degrees of objectivity and the organisation of the political 
community, in terms of objectified knowledge supporting different orders of worth, is 
usually removed from open political debate, once objectivity as public knowledge is 
collapsed with objectivity as true reality.  
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The connection existing between the process of objectifying and an evaluative 
dimension is easily neglected, especially when objectification is produced through 
quantification. This issue is of particular relevance for this specific kind of objective 
knowledge which is the knowledge produced by the social sciences, especially 
economics, of our social and economic world.  
CONVENTIONS OF QUANTIFICATION AND THE ‘AGREED UPON’ 
REALITY OF ECONOMIC OBJECTS 
In the effort of objectification supporting the construction of modern politics, in which 
public action is submitted to an imperative of justification and competing views are 
debated in the public space, science has played a crucial role in stabilising a world of so 
called ‘facts’ upon which public decision can be exercised. As discussed by Bruno 
Latour (1989), the perceived exteriority of scientific facts from any judgment or 
evaluative dimension is the result of ‘purification’. Purification is a social process 
which conceals the negotiations and controversies that produce ‘agreed upon’ facts. 
Once set, these agreed upon facts are then presented as facts tout court. The purification 
process consists in creating the condition for the ‘agreed upon reality’ produced by 
science to be assumed as the ‘truth to nature’ reality.  
This process of purification, which is distinctive of natural sciences, also takes place in 
the social sciences, in their effort to objectify our social and economic world. In 
particular, the transformation of economics from an ‘art’ into a ‘science’ is produced 
through a heavy investment in quantification (the use of numbers to express 
knowledge), followed by the use of mathematical models (the use of numbers to explain 
and predict). Quantification is, then, a tool supporting both coordination and the testing 
of possible courses of action in order to decide.  
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The purification process, in this case, is marked by the tendency to use ‘to measure’ as a 
synonym for ‘to quantify’ when discussing the expression through numbers of social or 
economic phenomena. But ‘to quantify’ is not a synonym for ‘to measure’ (Desrosières 
1993, 2008). 
To quantify is first of all to agree upon conventions of quantification which define 
measurable entities and the terms of their being measurable. Measure is possible only at 
a second stage. Quantification thus implies two distinct steps: to convene (or agree) 
upon and to measure. Only when conventions of quantification are set, then the actual 
measuring is possible: ‘The idea of measure, inspired by the traditional epistemology of 
natural sciences, implies that something exists in a format which is already measurable 
according to a realistic metrology, as the height of the Eiffel Tower’ (Desrosières 2008: 
3). In the social sciences, or in the evaluation of public action, the frequent use of the 
verb ‘to measure’ hides the roles of conventions of quantification and thus it can induce 
biases.  
As discussed by Chiapello and Desrosières (2009), a division of labour currently exists 
in the field of economics which encourages the confusion between ‘to quantify’ and ‘to 
measure’ or, to put it in other words, a division of labour that assures the purification of 
economic facts. Quantified data are widely used in economic works to support 
argumentations, through the use of mathematical models. These data are used without 
taking into account how numbers are produced, that is, through what kind of 
conventions of quantification. The emphasis is on methodology, that is on the 
appropriateness of the formalisation supporting the argument. Data are taken as given. 
Just a minority of works in economics explores the very same activity of producing 
measures, and these works are considered as marginal to the debate: ‘There was a time 
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though when the discussion on quantification, on the conventions to be adopted, was 
attractive to big names in the economic field. For them this was a scientific task of 
crucial importance and not a marginal detail, as it is considered today’ (Chiapello and 
Desrosières 2009: 188). The discussion concerning quantification is today assumed as 
the domain of hyper specialised experts, marginal to the main debates: ‘the gap between 
the discussion upstream on the production of numbers and their use downstream has 
never been so wide. It is inscribed in a form of division of labour coupled with a 
hierarchy of professional dignity’ (Ibid.: 189).   
The mere descriptive function of numbers is thus isolated from their being always a 
conventionalised description of the world, that is, agreed upon forms of informing and 
conforming reality. In fact, conventions of quantification create objects that often had 
no existence whatsoever before the achievement of this controversial socio-technical 
process.  
Let us take the example of unemployment. Unemployment is a social and historical 
construction of our societies which results from a process that began at the end of the 
nineteenth century and culminated in the 1930s. As discussed in the work of 
sociologists and economists (Salais et al. 1986; Topalov 1994), the construction of the 
object of unemployment was the product of a true ‘invention’. Unemployment did not 
appear as a new name for a previously existing reality, the lack of work, that became 
more visible with industrialisation. This category was created in order to operate as the 
cornerstone of the specific social and economic order created by Keynesian regulation. 
As argued by Gautié (2002), in current controversies concerning both the ‘good 
number’ of unemployment and the appropriateness of the existing indicators, the fact 
that unemployment is not the reflection of a pre-existing social reality but a quantified 
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object whose founding conventions are embedded in a specific form of regulation is 
largely neglected. What goes unnoticed is the connection between the controversies 
surrounding the measuring of unemployment and the progressive dismantling of the 
regime of regulation that justified the very same existence of unemployment as a 
specific social and economic reality.   
This is just an example that shows how, when forgetting the role of conventions of 
quantification in creating social and economic objects, it is difficult correctly to 
understand the problems we are confronted with when they start to be dysfunctional, 
that is, unable to settle disputes and respond to critique.  
For a quantified social or economic object to exist, time-consuming negotiations have to 
take place in an attempt to reach agreement (to convene upon) about the selected 
properties defining this specific social or economic object and the procedures that will 
assure the uniformity of the measuring. Previous to the possibility of measuring, so as to 
express phenomena through numbers, there is the active (that is, contested and 
negotiated) definition of the very same economic or social object and the shaping of 
‘conventions of equivalence’, involving comparisons, negotiations, compromises, 
translations, inscriptions, codifications, the definition of reproducible procedures of 
measurement, etc.  
As the example of unemployment clarifies, the contested and negotiated definition of 
conventions of quantification creating social and economic objects takes place within 
the frame of more general debates concerning the desirable organisation of economic 
and social life in our societies. If we pretend that expressing social and economic 
phenomena through numbers is simply a question of measuring pre-existing social and 
economic realities, we miss the dimension of social and cognitive creativity 
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(Desroisières 2008) which is distinctive of the process of quantification, and more in 
general of the process of objectifying.  
To quantify is not to mirror the world but it implies a transformative intervention: it 
implies the creation of social and economic objects that are forged in order to support a 
specific way to represent and express the world around us so as to act upon it. Through 
quantification, new objects or entities come into existence, and are then used to organise 
our life in common. To quantify is to reshape our world, introducing new entities that 
are clearly separated from us, and that, once created, have an independent life. 
Moreover, quantification constructs a commensurability, a space of equivalence that did 
not exist before, thus simplifying the evaluative complexity of the reality we are 
confronted with: ‘Numbers are the medium through which dissimilar desires, needs, and 
expectations are somehow made commensurable’ (Porter 1995: 86). Relevant meanings 
and dimensions of social life get lost in this process of commensuration, especially the 
forms of creating a communality with others that relies on familiarity and proximity 
(Thévenot 2006; Eliasoph 2007; Centemeri 2011).  
It is possible now better to understand in what terms the process of objectifying 
knowledge through numbers is costly. First of all, it implies the existence of a heavy 
socio-technical infrastructure that can assure its production. Objectivity through 
quantification is possible through investment in a set of material equipments and 
disciplined practices: ‘What we call the uniformity of nature is in practice a triumph of 
human organisation – of regulation, education, manufacturing, and method’ (Porter 
1995: 32).  Second, it is costly in terms of reducing the normative complexity of 
phenomena. The transparency and large-extent communality that quantification can 
guarantee go with a form of simplification, i.e. with assuming certain features of a 
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phenomenon as central, putting other features in the background. Usually the features 
that can be more easily translated into the language of numbers are the ones that are 
privileged in the process of quantifying. This implies privileging certain ways to value 
persons and things to the detriment of others and, consequently, to sustain certain forms 
of organising social relations to the detriment of others.iv In fact, when a space of 
equivalence is established, then comparison is possible, and ‘comparison (that is, to see 
together) is a political act’ (Desorisières 2008: 13). Through creating and stabilising the 
conditions for ‘see[ing] together’, the commensuration produced by conventions of 
quantification changes our political world.  
It should be clear by now that what is at stake in negotiations that fix conventions of 
quantification is the construction of a certain kind of political community that needs a 
conventional (stabilised) knowledge to rely on for its organisation.  
An important aspect that has to be stressed is that, once defined, a convention of 
quantification cannot conserve the traces of its own negotiated and controversial past, if 
it has to operate effectively as a principle of coordination: ‘any recollection of the 
processes through which the convention was established would most certainly reopen 
anxieties about its initial arbitrariness’ (Thévenot 2009: 795). This means that a 
convention of quantification has ‘two faces’ (Thévenot 2010). Once established, a 
convention of quantification has to be supported by a sort of ‘blind confidence’ that 
turns the conventional form into the ‘natural’ way to measure a reality. This reification 
process can be explained as the result of social actors assuming and using the quantified 
form as their common language. Quantified objects are objects that can ‘hold together’ 
(Desrosières 1993: p.18), that is, they are stable and they guarantee a stabilised 
connection of people and material entities through the creation of a space of 
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equivalence. The other forms of evaluation and coordination that are sacrificed in the 
establishment of the convention have to be forgotten for the quantified object to hold 
together.  
This blind confidence, however, can be broken once the convention starts to be 
dysfunctional. Usually this happens in times of change and crisis when new collective 
goals emerge that bring a critique of previously existing forms of economic and social 
order. The conformist, formulaic and inauthentic arbitrariness of the convention of 
quantification is thus exposed and denounced.  
Let us take the example of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). During the 1950s, GDP 
started to be used conventionally as the appropriate way to express a country’s standard 
of living, even if the convention of quantification on which it is based simply expresses 
the market value of all final goods and services produced within a country in a given 
period. Today, GDP is highly criticised as a measure of well-being, since it does not 
take into account emerging issues in the public definition of what should be considered 
as well-being  (e.g.. environmental quality) and there is an ongoing controversial 
discussion meant to stabilise new quantified indicators (Gadrey and Jany-Catrice 2005). 
This example shows how the process of stabilisation of conventions of quantification 
works, through controversies and negotiations that concern the good way to quantify. 
The good way to quantify is not to be understood in a merely technical way but is 
related to the capacity of the quantified object to guide public action in responding to 
emerging public issues according to the collective goals we want to achieve as a society 
(for example, in this case, environmental quality). Once conventions are stabilised, 
doubts disappear concerning the appropriateness of the measure in representing the 
issue at stake. 
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What the example of GDP also shows is that we can never completely separate 
quantification as a support for coordination, which organises our world in common 
through the active production of quantified objects, and quantification as a tool to ‘test’ 
hypotheses and to support public decision through models and formalisation 
(Desrosières 2008). In fact, GDP was created as part of the national accounting system, 
as a piece in the theoretical construction supporting the definition of Keynesian policies. 
Later it was isolated from the model and appropriated by various social actors to 
express something else, that is, a measure of well-being.  
Quantified objects, once created, have a life in different worlds, the world of the 
expertise of mathematical formalisation, but also the world in which the objectivity of 
numbers is used in order to build and to support or criticise public issues in the public 
space.  
This circulation of quantified objects across different worlds raises an important 
challenge to social scientists, that is, the need to create the conditions for discussing in 
the public space the significance of quantified objects, their founding conventions, and 
their political impacts.  
DISCUSSING QUANTIFICATION IN THE PUBLIC SPACE: WHAT 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR SOCIAL SCIENTISTS? 
The need to debate quantification in the public space is today particularly pressing, 
considering that the emergence of a neo-liberal state goes with new public management 
tools that stress the importance of quantified indicators of performance in guiding 
public action. Benchmarking has become an instrument through which a form of 
governing by numbers is assured (Power 1997).  
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A clear example of this evolution is the use of the Open Method of Coordination 
(OMC) in the European Union. The OMC is based on the maximisation of public action 
performance judged according to quantified objectives. The qualitative diversity of the 
different European societies is thus reduced to a position in a ranking. Diversity, once 
quantified, allows for comparison and becomes a tool to increase competition. Through 
competition, the system with the better performance becomes the model or the good 
practice to be followed. Public decision is thus presented as transparently guided by 
objective indicators, with no need apparently to exercise any form of discretional 
judgment. This quest for the highest degree of impersonality in public decision, limiting 
the open exercise of judgment, is linked to an evolution that sees an increasing role for 
accountability over authority in legitimising public action (Porter 1995). 
However, public action guided by quantified objectives can be considered as transparent 
and impersonal only if we forget or conceal the role played by conventions of 
quantification. If quantified objectives determine public decision, then conventions of 
quantification become the ultimate place of political decision but their claimed technical 
and expert status removes them from an open democratic debate (Salais 2008).  
‘Governing through norms’ or ‘through objectives’ (Thévenot 1997; 2010) implies that 
politically legitimate authorities are replaced by devices of normalisation and 
independent authorities of regulation that largely elude democratic political control and 
critique. Legitimate authority is distributed among a variety of quantified objects, such 
as indicators of performance, and coordination is left to market mechanisms considered 
as mere technical procedures of aggregation. The claimed realism of these objects and 
mechanisms obscures the political dimension of both the market as a specific order of 
worth and of the issues at stake. If openly debated in their relation to various collective 
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ends considered as valuable, these issues raise the relevance of other competing modes 
of evaluation of persons and things that should be taken into account in defining the 
probative reality to judge public action.  
The definition of the ‘informational base’ (Salais 2008) on which public action and 
public policies are judged is, then, today, more than ever, a socio-technical process in 
which fundamental political choices are made. However, the process of production of 
objectified knowledge about our social and economic world is usually inaccessible to an 
open public debate. Nothing resembling ‘hybrid forums’ (Callon et al. 2001) has clearly 
emerged yet to discuss the production of these specific political-technical objects that 
are quantified indicators guiding today’s public action, especially in the economic 
field.v    
Moreover, ignorance among the large majority of citizens of the conventions of 
quantification that produce the numbers on which public action is evaluated contributes 
to a situation of ‘cognitive ambiguity’: ‘if, for example, the rate of employment 
increases, the ordinary citizen will assume that his/her opportunities to find a job 
(conforming to his/her expectations concerning what is a good job) are increasing. But 
it can be –and it actually is- that European authorities attribute a completely different 
meaning to the notion of employment, a meaning which is aligned with the policy of 
deregulation of job markets that they are running and that plays against ordinary 
citizens’ expectations’ (Ibid.: 313).  
The absence of public knowledge and discussion concerning conventions of 
quantification helps to understand why public debate is nowadays often crowded with 
numbers that are not able to settle disputes. The connection is lost between the existence 
of different forms of valuing things and different constructions of objective knowledge 
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that can, or cannot, support a judgment responding to criteria of evaluation considered 
as relevant in the situation.   
This connection is increasingly removed from an open debate. Truth be told, this 
connection is not easily debatable. As already argued, economic and social quantified 
objects are ‘conventional’, which means that they are the result of an agreement. They 
are artificial, but at the same time the agreement on which they rest turns them into 
realities actors can rely upon in order to act. If this tension is not kept open, we tend to 
swing constantly between two opposing attitudes: to claim that quantified knowledge is 
an unquestionable reality, on the one hand; to denounce objective knowledge as 
constructed and then not real, on the other.  
The social sciences are still largely trapped in this dichotomy of realism versus 
constructivism, that prevents us from understanding correctly the objectivity of 
quantified objects. Neoclassical economics is the typical example of a social science in 
which quantified knowledge is considered as a ‘fact’, obscuring the work of setting 
conventions of quantification and the evaluative dimension implicit in this process. 
Critical sociology is, on the contrary, the example of a sociology of denunciation, 
engaged in re-opening ‘black boxes’ of knowledge in order to show power relationships 
hidden behind the veil of realism. This position often leads us to think that there will be 
a reality somewhere, not biased, and accessible to our knowledge (Desrosières 1992).  
According to the sociology of quantification, it is possible to work out a different way 
to deal with the question of constructivism versus realism. Conventions of 
quantification defining solid objects of knowledge bring into existence realities, even if 
they are conventional. This realism should be intended as embeddedness in a common 
world, at cognitive and material levels. Quantified objects are inscribed in a web of 
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relations that gives account of their validity and solidity, cognitively and materially. 
This web of relations is made through stabilised connections (for example among 
categories to classify or technical objects), routines of equivalence, stabilised words to 
qualify objects and processes, procedures for measurement.  
The reality of objective knowledge is related to the fact that countless people consider 
this same knowledge as an object of reference in order to act and that this object of 
reference is embodied in institutional arrangements (Desrosières 1992) . This 
knowledge is an object of reference, but at the same time the object of reference could 
be questioned, since it is conventional (that is, discretional). Critical conjunctures (or 
crises) are marked exactly by the questioning of common objects of reference that are 
denounced or disqualified in their capacity to support the organisation of the political 
community meant to assure common goods considered as valuable.   
Questioning objective knowledge, included quantified knowledge, is always possible, 
but we have to consider the fact that heavy political, social and technical investments 
were made in order to produce this objectified knowledge. To dismantle old 
conventions, so as to create new ones, is a costly operation. That is why, when a 
conventional object is under critical scrutiny, ‘participants in the controversy strive to 
have earlier investments salvaged and reincorporated into the new ones, which are never 
created from scratch but are instead founded upon the transformations of former 
investments, by extending their spatial or temporal validity or their solidity’ (Thévenot, 
2009: 795).  
This resistance to change can be considered a mark of realism. In this sense, ‘being real’ 
can be defined as the capacity of objects to pass the tests of reality that aim at their 
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dismantling, that is, objectivity can be seen as the capacity of objects to object (Latour 
2000).  
In the exploration of the conditions that make possible the existence of a public space, 
we are, then, confronted with a constitutive tension concerning objectivity. Objectivity 
is needed in terms of the need for stabilised objects of reference necessary for a public 
debate to take place. Only if ‘a world in common’ exists can different perspectives on 
the political community be debateable in the public space (Arendt 1958). At the same 
time, the debate can always turn into a critique of these same objects of reference that 
constitute our world in common. The objects of knowledge that furnished our world in 
common can become the very same object of the debate, because of their conventional 
nature.  
Keeping this tension alive, or ‘allowing the unquestionable to be questioned’ 
(Desrosières 1992), is what makes possible the very same existence of public space, as a 
space in which the exploration of collective ends (and the means to achieve them) is 
kept open to revision. Assuming and exploring this constitutive tension, without simply 
concealing or denouncing it, is maybe one of the most important contributions of social 
scientists to the construction of the conditions for a good life together in a complex 
world.  
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i
 This contribution discusses some of the issues I am currently exploring in an ongoing 
project funded by the Portuguese Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (FCT): Choice 
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beyond (in)commensurability: controversies and public decision making on territorial 
sustainable development (BeCom) (FCOMP-01-0124-FEDER-009234). 
ii
 Orders of worth are ‘coherent principles of evaluation (…). Each defines the good, the 
just, and the fair – but according to different criteria of judgment’ (Stark 2009: 23)’. 
These multiple orders (civic, market, inspired, fame, industrial, and domestic) are not 
associated with particular social domains but coexist in the same social space. Usually 
this coexistence in the situation of the action of different orders of worth, that leads to 
‘dissonance’ or incommensurability, results in the construction of a ‘compromise’ 
(Boltanski and Thévenot 1991), that is, to forms of evaluating things and persons that 
compose two or more different criteria of judgment.   
iii
 Considering market goods as self-evident objects is what Benetti and Cartelier 
(1980:94) call the ‘nomenclature hypothesis’. This hypothesis is one of the constitutive 
assumptions supporting the neoclassical theory of market: ‘the nomenclature hypothesis 
implies supposing as possible a description of a group of things qualified as goods or 
commodities, previously to any proposition concerning society. To put it in other 
words, the specific social forms (exchange, production, …) are built on a neutral basis: 
nature or the physical world’. 
iv
 This historically led to excluding, marginalising (even suppressing) forms of social 
organisation resting on alternative ways to value (Santos 2007). 
v
 The research conducted by Callon et al. (2000) shows how in the field of 
environmental risks and health issues, the definition of the relevant objectivity in order 
publicly to decide increasingly involves recourse to participation procedures that aim at 
involving the wide variety of ‘affected’ actors. These authors introduced the concept of 
‘hybrid forums’ to define these situations of public discussion. Hybrid forums are 
‘forums’ because they are open spaces where groups can come together to discuss 
technical options involving the collective. They are hybrid because the groups involved 
are heterogeneous (experts, politicians, technicians, laypersons). Their hybridism is also 
related to the fact that questions and problems are discussed taking into account plural 
concerns.  
